From jseidel@ccil.org Thu May 3 13:49:16 2001 From: jseidel@ccil.org (Jordan Seidel) Date: Thu, 3 May 2001 08:49:16 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Pomo] meeting today Message-ID: hi, just wanted to touch base -- we are meeting at normal time (1.15) at the indian garden(?) in the gay street plaza...i will be in front of main hall at about 1.00 if anyone wants a ride there...let me know...see you then! Best Regards, Jordan S. jseidel@ccil.org "Preach the gospel at all times. Use words if necessary." ~ St. Francis of Assisi From jseidel@ccil.org Fri May 4 13:41:11 2001 From: jseidel@ccil.org (Jordan Seidel) Date: Fri, 4 May 2001 08:41:11 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Pomo] follow-up Message-ID: hi, thanks again for the great 15 weeks of conversation and reading, and learning...i mentioned some authors the other day and wanted to share some recent blurbs (taken from a paper i did last spring) to give a flavor, they are good books (citations at bottom)...also, regarding our discussion on religion as meta/micro-narrative...although i have taken on a an explicitly christian perspective and account, i resist what i call caricatured accounts that reduce a particular account to a few aspects -- it seems to me that this is just the impulse pomo wants to make us very conscious of...that is, by characterizing a christain account(or any view), one is always already invoking a narrative and partaking in a universalizing move...in addition, anyone who takes their account of life seriously will reject a simplistic reduction of it into well-worn cliches that do not promote understanding...i apologize if i seem a bit reactionary...i just want to defend a more subtle and empirical sensitivity...have a great summer! ******** As Steuerman indicates: "The radical psychoanalytic idea of the unconscious_so crucial to Freud, was_difficult for him [Habermas] to accept. Habermas over-emphasized the dimension of intersubjective relations that can be known to the detriment of that which is never fully known_This difficulty with the unconscious marks and limits Habermas's understanding of rationality. It also restricts and weakens his move to a communicative theory of action and to his discourse on ethics" (Steuerman, 2000: p.13). Additionally, I find compelling Steuerman's thesis that psychoanalysis can remind us of the unknown (read: the other) in communicative rationality, hence providing corrective insights into a language-game treating ethics and on judgement. In her treatment of psychoanalytic theories, Steuerman contrasts two basic ways of dealing with intersubjective reality: the paranoid-schizoid position, and the depressive position. With the paranoid-schizoid position, the world is split in two - the good and the bad objects; the bad objects being excluded, denied, destroyed, or projected outside; the depressive position, which Steuerman favors, is an attempt to apprehend the object more as a whole, good and bad. This position seeks to reintegrate parts of oneself that had been split off and denied. In spite of its name, the depressive position is actually the position where we are freer from our more destructive aspects, it is the recognition of the others that form our world, of how dependent I am, for my own happiness, on the endurance and existence of others. For Steuerman, the idea of emancipation/autonomy (perhaps a heteronomy?) gains a new meaning within the depressive position: in this position we recognize the possibility of reintegrating parts of ourselves and our minds that have caused unbearable conflict and have been split off (in other words, the condition for the possibility of emancipation does not necessitate a suppression/repression of these experiences). And according to Steuerman, this understanding also means that we eventually have to face the loss of an ideal, conflict-free existence, both within ourselves and in the external world. But it also means that we can grasp what a truly intersubjective world we live in, and how the indeterminate and ever shifting barriers of I and Thou, We and They can be construed/constructed to serve specific purposes (Ref. Steuerman, 2000: p.18-19). Cavarero: "Taken as a concept, uniqueness corresponds with the extreme form of the particular - or better, to the absolute 'one;' or rather, to a form of the particular that is free [sciolta] of any universality that tries to redeem it, or erase the miracle of finitude. Because this, from Plato onwards, has been precisely the mission that philosophy, seduced by the universal, originally decided to take upon itself: to redeem, to save, to rescue the particular from its finitude, and uniqueness from its scandal. This task of redemption, however, logically transformed itself into an act of erasure_To save by suppressing is of course an ancient law that philosophers call dialectic" (Cavarero, 2000: p.53). ************ Cavarero, Adriana. 2000. Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. London: Routledge. Steuerman, Emilia. 2000. The Bounds of Reason: Habermas, Lyotard and Melanie Klein on Rationality. London: Routledge. Best Regards, Jordan S. jseidel@ccil.org "Preach the gospel at all times. Use words if necessary." ~ St. Francis of Assisi From pemmons@wcupa.edu Fri May 4 22:12:14 2001 From: pemmons@wcupa.edu (Emmons, Paul) Date: Fri, 4 May 2001 17:12:14 -0400 Subject: [Pomo] follow-up Message-ID: >paranoid-schizoid position, and the depressive position. This reminds me that years ago a psychiatrist said (although I don't think it was a formal diagnosis) that my personality was schizoid. My favorite first cousin also described himself that way once, when we were both kids. After several decades of good, maybe even brilliant, work as a research chemist, he rather suddenly went to pieces and is now too mentally ill to support himself. Schizoid personalities are more susceptible than most people to schizophrenia, but they are virtually immune to manic-depressive psychosis, which most threatens personalities that are at the opposite end of some kind of scale. So I am quite ready to believe in such a conceptual dichotomy-- although the fact that Steuerman associates them with extreme personality types suggests that they must be, likewise, extremes on a scale and that most people manifest a middle position. >the depressive position is actually the position where we are freer from our more destructive aspects, it is the recognition of the others that form our world, of how dependent I am, for my own happiness, on the endurance and existence of others. This is a big thrust of my religion (Anglo-Catholicism, which certainly encourages this consideration in general terms; and in the last few years I have become increasingly aware of and interested in studying those who emphasize and develop this concept even more. Eastern Orthodoxy has always, apparently, placed great emphasis on personhood and upon the corporate nature of the church. A fascinating contemporary exposition of this approach is "Being as Communion" by John Zizioulas. Jordan, I think that you would find this book very interesting, too.) If Steuerman's analysis is correct, I should be a fundamentalist instead, but I am actually averse to fundamentalism or any form of Christianity that exalts the individual and neglects the communal experience. There is a degree of cognitive dissonance here, not only with a personal tendency to individualism, but with the doctrines of individualism that the American state papers and a capitalistic environment have steeped us in from our cradles. My emotional habit may be to bifurcate things into good and bad, but my intellectual response is more circumspect and nuanced, and I think always has been to the extent that I am equipped to articulate it as an educated, rather than a merely conditioned, person. Inasmuch as manic-depression (as opposed schizoid personality) is like being on an emotional roller-coaster, I'd be inclined to question how reliably Steuerman's dichotomy actually corresponds to the personality types with which she associates them. Part of the postmodern condition, of course, is that the corporate entities that dominate the media and the marketplace present us all with a vast array of Hobson's choices, usually dichotomies, and bid us to consider it cool or self-fulfilling to identify with one and reject the other. In this way we are constantly reassured that we are free people living in a democracy. For example, I caught myself saying this afternoon that "I am a Coke person" (rather than a Pepsi person). Of course we speak this way with irony, which is part of the allure. But isn't it a bad habit nevertheless, as a matter of mental hygiene? I was just reading today the introductory chapter "social message of pure science" in _The Logic of Liberty_ by Michael Polanyi. Writing in 1945, he says of pure science "What justification is there in scientific studies which have no visible practical use? Until fairly recently it used to be commonly assumed that such studies served their own purpose, the discovery of knowledge for the love of truth." But Polanyi says that this view has not been popular since 1930, and that its decline is due to a "definite philosophical movement of recent times." Intellectual and moral appeals, respectively, have instead been made to what I would call utilitarian ends, as one claims either that these ends have always been the real purpose of science, or that scientists are self-indulgent and immoral if they do not adopt these ends. "A new destructive skepticism is linked here to a new passionate social conscience; an utter disbelief in the spirit of man is coupled with extravagant moral demands... the chisel of scepticism driven by the hammer of social passion." This sounds like a description of the postmodern world. Especially, it anticipates Lyotard's perception that science now stands in need of an external metanarrative to justify itself. What is chilling about this description is that Polanyi (who had lived in Germany before moving to England) points to it as one of the conditions that allowed Nazism to come to power. "There was no sufficiently strong belief in justice and reason left in which to embody social passions. A generation grew up full of moral fire and yet despising reason and justice. Believing instead in what? -- in the forces which were left for them to believe in -- in Power, Economic Interest, Subconscious Desire. These they accepted therefore as the ultimate reality to which they could entrust themselves." He went on to describe how universities that upheld the claims of pure scholarship suffered under totalitarianism, while those universities had an easier time that "allowed themselves to be cajoled or terrorized into compromising their standards." Meanwhile, pure scientists the world over respected one another and felt that they formed a community untouched by political differences. We need today, Polanyi said, this "example of the good life... the body of a great and good society." The fact that this activity is assailed by "some of the most enterprising and generous sentiments of our days" only makes them all the more dangerous. Many thanks to everyone, and especially to Jordan for such consciencious shepherding and leadership during the whole semester. A group like this is nowhere in my job description, but I always felt that in spirit it represented the most important thing we're on campus to do. I often regretted that I didn't have more time to devote to it. Paul From jseidel@ccil.org Fri May 11 12:22:07 2001 From: jseidel@ccil.org (Jordan Seidel) Date: Fri, 11 May 2001 07:22:07 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Pomo] [Philnet] Conference Announcement (fwd) Message-ID: good morning, prof. udell thought you might be interested in the conference below... Best Regards, Jordan S. jseidel@ccil.org "Preach the gospel at all times. Use words if necessary."=20 =09 =09 ~ St. Francis of Assisi ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 11 May 2001 10:34:37 +0200 From: John Maynor To: PHILOS-L@LISTSERV.LIV.AC.UK Subject: [Philnet] Conference Announcement Apologies for cross-posting. Conference Announcement CONTEXTUALIZING RAWLS The reception of analytical political philosophy in Europe One and a Half - Day Conference Friday 29th and Saturday 30th June 2001 The Committee Room, The Strand Building, King's College, Strand, London With: Catherine Audard (LSE), Pavel Barsa (Budapest), Andreas F=F8llesdal (Oslo), John Horton (Keele), Percy Lehning (Rotterdam), Jan M=FCller (Oxford), Mario Ricciardi (Milan), Jo=E3o Rosas (Braga). Organiser: Dr C=E9cile Laborde, European Studies, King's College, Strand London WC2LR 2LS (020 78481833, cecile.laborde@kcl.ac.uk) The conference begins at 2.30pm on Friday 29th June and ends at 5pm on Saturday 30th June. The conference is sponsored by: the British Academy, French Department, King's College, Forum for European Philosophy, UK Political Studies Association To register, please return registration slip and cheque (payable to King's College London) to Rita Pannen, Administrator for European Studies, King's College, Strand WC2LR (tel. 02078482468; fax. 020 7848 2450, rita.pannen@kcl.ac.uk) Registration fees: full fee (includes Saturday lunch)=A318 (unwaged =A310), reduced fee (excludes Saturday lunch) =A310 (unwaged: =A37). Contextualizing Rawls. The reception of analytical political philosophy in Europe 29-30 June 2001, King's College London REGISTRATION FORM Name:=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85... Address:=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85.. =85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85.. Tel/email:=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85 Signed:=85=85=85=85=85 Date:=85=85=85=85=85. Full fee: =A318 (includes Saturday lunch) Unwaged =A310 Reduced fee: =A310 (excludes Saturday lunch) Unwaged: =A37. Please return registration slip and cheque (payable to King's College London) to Rita Pannen, Administrator for European Studies, King's College, Strand WC2LR (tel. 02078482468; fax. 0207 848 2450, rita.pannen@kcl.ac.uk) -- Dr. John W. Maynor Institute of International Relations Faculty of Law, Comenius University af=E1rikovo N=E1m. 6, 818 05 Bratislava Slovak Republic Tel: +00421 903 676 098 Fax: +00421 7 5293 2889 maynor@flaw.uniba.sk Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/phi= los-l.html. Other philosophical resources on the Web can be found at http://www.liv.ac.= uk/Philosophy/philos.html _______________________________________________ Philnet mailing list Philnet@lists.ccil.org http://lists.ccil.org/mailman/listinfo/philnet From jseidel@ccil.org Thu May 3 13:49:16 2001 From: jseidel@ccil.org (Jordan Seidel) Date: Thu, 3 May 2001 08:49:16 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Pomo] meeting today Message-ID: hi, just wanted to touch base -- we are meeting at normal time (1.15) at the indian garden(?) in the gay street plaza...i will be in front of main hall at about 1.00 if anyone wants a ride there...let me know...see you then! Best Regards, Jordan S. jseidel@ccil.org "Preach the gospel at all times. Use words if necessary." ~ St. Francis of Assisi From jseidel@ccil.org Fri May 4 13:41:11 2001 From: jseidel@ccil.org (Jordan Seidel) Date: Fri, 4 May 2001 08:41:11 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Pomo] follow-up Message-ID: hi, thanks again for the great 15 weeks of conversation and reading, and learning...i mentioned some authors the other day and wanted to share some recent blurbs (taken from a paper i did last spring) to give a flavor, they are good books (citations at bottom)...also, regarding our discussion on religion as meta/micro-narrative...although i have taken on a an explicitly christian perspective and account, i resist what i call caricatured accounts that reduce a particular account to a few aspects -- it seems to me that this is just the impulse pomo wants to make us very conscious of...that is, by characterizing a christain account(or any view), one is always already invoking a narrative and partaking in a universalizing move...in addition, anyone who takes their account of life seriously will reject a simplistic reduction of it into well-worn cliches that do not promote understanding...i apologize if i seem a bit reactionary...i just want to defend a more subtle and empirical sensitivity...have a great summer! ******** As Steuerman indicates: "The radical psychoanalytic idea of the unconscious_so crucial to Freud, was_difficult for him [Habermas] to accept. Habermas over-emphasized the dimension of intersubjective relations that can be known to the detriment of that which is never fully known_This difficulty with the unconscious marks and limits Habermas's understanding of rationality. It also restricts and weakens his move to a communicative theory of action and to his discourse on ethics" (Steuerman, 2000: p.13). Additionally, I find compelling Steuerman's thesis that psychoanalysis can remind us of the unknown (read: the other) in communicative rationality, hence providing corrective insights into a language-game treating ethics and on judgement. In her treatment of psychoanalytic theories, Steuerman contrasts two basic ways of dealing with intersubjective reality: the paranoid-schizoid position, and the depressive position. With the paranoid-schizoid position, the world is split in two - the good and the bad objects; the bad objects being excluded, denied, destroyed, or projected outside; the depressive position, which Steuerman favors, is an attempt to apprehend the object more as a whole, good and bad. This position seeks to reintegrate parts of oneself that had been split off and denied. In spite of its name, the depressive position is actually the position where we are freer from our more destructive aspects, it is the recognition of the others that form our world, of how dependent I am, for my own happiness, on the endurance and existence of others. For Steuerman, the idea of emancipation/autonomy (perhaps a heteronomy?) gains a new meaning within the depressive position: in this position we recognize the possibility of reintegrating parts of ourselves and our minds that have caused unbearable conflict and have been split off (in other words, the condition for the possibility of emancipation does not necessitate a suppression/repression of these experiences). And according to Steuerman, this understanding also means that we eventually have to face the loss of an ideal, conflict-free existence, both within ourselves and in the external world. But it also means that we can grasp what a truly intersubjective world we live in, and how the indeterminate and ever shifting barriers of I and Thou, We and They can be construed/constructed to serve specific purposes (Ref. Steuerman, 2000: p.18-19). Cavarero: "Taken as a concept, uniqueness corresponds with the extreme form of the particular - or better, to the absolute 'one;' or rather, to a form of the particular that is free [sciolta] of any universality that tries to redeem it, or erase the miracle of finitude. Because this, from Plato onwards, has been precisely the mission that philosophy, seduced by the universal, originally decided to take upon itself: to redeem, to save, to rescue the particular from its finitude, and uniqueness from its scandal. This task of redemption, however, logically transformed itself into an act of erasure_To save by suppressing is of course an ancient law that philosophers call dialectic" (Cavarero, 2000: p.53). ************ Cavarero, Adriana. 2000. Relating Narratives: Storytelling and Selfhood. London: Routledge. Steuerman, Emilia. 2000. The Bounds of Reason: Habermas, Lyotard and Melanie Klein on Rationality. London: Routledge. Best Regards, Jordan S. jseidel@ccil.org "Preach the gospel at all times. Use words if necessary." ~ St. Francis of Assisi From pemmons@wcupa.edu Fri May 4 22:12:14 2001 From: pemmons@wcupa.edu (Emmons, Paul) Date: Fri, 4 May 2001 17:12:14 -0400 Subject: [Pomo] follow-up Message-ID: >paranoid-schizoid position, and the depressive position. This reminds me that years ago a psychiatrist said (although I don't think it was a formal diagnosis) that my personality was schizoid. My favorite first cousin also described himself that way once, when we were both kids. After several decades of good, maybe even brilliant, work as a research chemist, he rather suddenly went to pieces and is now too mentally ill to support himself. Schizoid personalities are more susceptible than most people to schizophrenia, but they are virtually immune to manic-depressive psychosis, which most threatens personalities that are at the opposite end of some kind of scale. So I am quite ready to believe in such a conceptual dichotomy-- although the fact that Steuerman associates them with extreme personality types suggests that they must be, likewise, extremes on a scale and that most people manifest a middle position. >the depressive position is actually the position where we are freer from our more destructive aspects, it is the recognition of the others that form our world, of how dependent I am, for my own happiness, on the endurance and existence of others. This is a big thrust of my religion (Anglo-Catholicism, which certainly encourages this consideration in general terms; and in the last few years I have become increasingly aware of and interested in studying those who emphasize and develop this concept even more. Eastern Orthodoxy has always, apparently, placed great emphasis on personhood and upon the corporate nature of the church. A fascinating contemporary exposition of this approach is "Being as Communion" by John Zizioulas. Jordan, I think that you would find this book very interesting, too.) If Steuerman's analysis is correct, I should be a fundamentalist instead, but I am actually averse to fundamentalism or any form of Christianity that exalts the individual and neglects the communal experience. There is a degree of cognitive dissonance here, not only with a personal tendency to individualism, but with the doctrines of individualism that the American state papers and a capitalistic environment have steeped us in from our cradles. My emotional habit may be to bifurcate things into good and bad, but my intellectual response is more circumspect and nuanced, and I think always has been to the extent that I am equipped to articulate it as an educated, rather than a merely conditioned, person. Inasmuch as manic-depression (as opposed schizoid personality) is like being on an emotional roller-coaster, I'd be inclined to question how reliably Steuerman's dichotomy actually corresponds to the personality types with which she associates them. Part of the postmodern condition, of course, is that the corporate entities that dominate the media and the marketplace present us all with a vast array of Hobson's choices, usually dichotomies, and bid us to consider it cool or self-fulfilling to identify with one and reject the other. In this way we are constantly reassured that we are free people living in a democracy. For example, I caught myself saying this afternoon that "I am a Coke person" (rather than a Pepsi person). Of course we speak this way with irony, which is part of the allure. But isn't it a bad habit nevertheless, as a matter of mental hygiene? I was just reading today the introductory chapter "social message of pure science" in _The Logic of Liberty_ by Michael Polanyi. Writing in 1945, he says of pure science "What justification is there in scientific studies which have no visible practical use? Until fairly recently it used to be commonly assumed that such studies served their own purpose, the discovery of knowledge for the love of truth." But Polanyi says that this view has not been popular since 1930, and that its decline is due to a "definite philosophical movement of recent times." Intellectual and moral appeals, respectively, have instead been made to what I would call utilitarian ends, as one claims either that these ends have always been the real purpose of science, or that scientists are self-indulgent and immoral if they do not adopt these ends. "A new destructive skepticism is linked here to a new passionate social conscience; an utter disbelief in the spirit of man is coupled with extravagant moral demands... the chisel of scepticism driven by the hammer of social passion." This sounds like a description of the postmodern world. Especially, it anticipates Lyotard's perception that science now stands in need of an external metanarrative to justify itself. What is chilling about this description is that Polanyi (who had lived in Germany before moving to England) points to it as one of the conditions that allowed Nazism to come to power. "There was no sufficiently strong belief in justice and reason left in which to embody social passions. A generation grew up full of moral fire and yet despising reason and justice. Believing instead in what? -- in the forces which were left for them to believe in -- in Power, Economic Interest, Subconscious Desire. These they accepted therefore as the ultimate reality to which they could entrust themselves." He went on to describe how universities that upheld the claims of pure scholarship suffered under totalitarianism, while those universities had an easier time that "allowed themselves to be cajoled or terrorized into compromising their standards." Meanwhile, pure scientists the world over respected one another and felt that they formed a community untouched by political differences. We need today, Polanyi said, this "example of the good life... the body of a great and good society." The fact that this activity is assailed by "some of the most enterprising and generous sentiments of our days" only makes them all the more dangerous. Many thanks to everyone, and especially to Jordan for such consciencious shepherding and leadership during the whole semester. A group like this is nowhere in my job description, but I always felt that in spirit it represented the most important thing we're on campus to do. I often regretted that I didn't have more time to devote to it. Paul From jseidel@ccil.org Fri May 11 12:22:07 2001 From: jseidel@ccil.org (Jordan Seidel) Date: Fri, 11 May 2001 07:22:07 -0400 (EDT) Subject: [Pomo] [Philnet] Conference Announcement (fwd) Message-ID: good morning, prof. udell thought you might be interested in the conference below... Best Regards, Jordan S. jseidel@ccil.org "Preach the gospel at all times. Use words if necessary."=20 =09 =09 ~ St. Francis of Assisi ---------- Forwarded message ---------- Date: Fri, 11 May 2001 10:34:37 +0200 From: John Maynor To: PHILOS-L@LISTSERV.LIV.AC.UK Subject: [Philnet] Conference Announcement Apologies for cross-posting. Conference Announcement CONTEXTUALIZING RAWLS The reception of analytical political philosophy in Europe One and a Half - Day Conference Friday 29th and Saturday 30th June 2001 The Committee Room, The Strand Building, King's College, Strand, London With: Catherine Audard (LSE), Pavel Barsa (Budapest), Andreas F=F8llesdal (Oslo), John Horton (Keele), Percy Lehning (Rotterdam), Jan M=FCller (Oxford), Mario Ricciardi (Milan), Jo=E3o Rosas (Braga). Organiser: Dr C=E9cile Laborde, European Studies, King's College, Strand London WC2LR 2LS (020 78481833, cecile.laborde@kcl.ac.uk) The conference begins at 2.30pm on Friday 29th June and ends at 5pm on Saturday 30th June. The conference is sponsored by: the British Academy, French Department, King's College, Forum for European Philosophy, UK Political Studies Association To register, please return registration slip and cheque (payable to King's College London) to Rita Pannen, Administrator for European Studies, King's College, Strand WC2LR (tel. 02078482468; fax. 020 7848 2450, rita.pannen@kcl.ac.uk) Registration fees: full fee (includes Saturday lunch)=A318 (unwaged =A310), reduced fee (excludes Saturday lunch) =A310 (unwaged: =A37). Contextualizing Rawls. The reception of analytical political philosophy in Europe 29-30 June 2001, King's College London REGISTRATION FORM Name:=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85... Address:=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85.. =85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85.. Tel/email:=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85=85 Signed:=85=85=85=85=85 Date:=85=85=85=85=85. Full fee: =A318 (includes Saturday lunch) Unwaged =A310 Reduced fee: =A310 (excludes Saturday lunch) Unwaged: =A37. Please return registration slip and cheque (payable to King's College London) to Rita Pannen, Administrator for European Studies, King's College, Strand WC2LR (tel. 02078482468; fax. 0207 848 2450, rita.pannen@kcl.ac.uk) -- Dr. John W. Maynor Institute of International Relations Faculty of Law, Comenius University af=E1rikovo N=E1m. 6, 818 05 Bratislava Slovak Republic Tel: +00421 903 676 098 Fax: +00421 7 5293 2889 maynor@flaw.uniba.sk Messages to the list are archived at http://listserv.liv.ac.uk/archives/phi= los-l.html. Other philosophical resources on the Web can be found at http://www.liv.ac.= uk/Philosophy/philos.html _______________________________________________ Philnet mailing list Philnet@lists.ccil.org http://lists.ccil.org/mailman/listinfo/philnet