[Philnet] JEAN-NICOD LECTURES 2001

[Prof S.R.L. Clark]

Date: Thu, 27 Sep 2001 10:43:21 +0800
From: Francois Recanati <Francois.Recanati@ehess.fr>

JEAN-NICOD LECTURES 2001
Centre national de la recherche scientifique
(d=E9partement des sciences de l'homme et de la soci=E9t=E9)

in association with : Minist=E8re de la Recherche (ACI Cognitique)
Ecole des hautes =E9tudes en sciences sociales
Fondation Maison des Sciences de l'Homme

DANIEL DENNETT
The Science of Consciousness:
Removing the Philosophical Obstacles


1. Can there be a "first-person" science of consciousness?
Wednesday, 7 November, at 4:30 p.m.
Auditorium du CNRS, 3 rue Michel-Ange, 75016 Paris
Professor Dennett will be awarded the Jean-Nicod Prize after the lecture.
Abstract:
  The objective, "third-person" methods of science can be adapted to the ne=
utral
study of consciousness, in the approach I call heterophenomenology.
Challenges to
this approach have recently be expressed, but a close examination
shows that they
do not offer a genuine alternative to heterophenomenology, which
continues to be
the best approach for a science of consciouness.

2. The Hard Question, not the Hard Problem: How to model an uninhabited min=
d
Friday 9 November, at 3 p.m.
EHESS, salle 524, 54 boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris
Abstract:
  If a candidate theory of consciousness still includes, unanalyzed, a Self=
 or
Subject, has it not merely postponed the main task of such a theory?
On the other
hand, if a candidate theory of consciousness dissolves the Subject into
organizations of unconscious subsystems, has it not left out the main
topic? What
is the burden for any proper theory of consciousness, and how can it be met=
?

3. Are Qualia what make life worth living?
Tuesday 13 November, at 3 p.m.
EHESS, salle 524, 54 boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris
Abstract:
  Qualia, or feelings, or sensations, are often declared to be a major stum=
bling
block for "functionalist" theories of consciousness. But if qualia are
important--if they are, as Sellars has maintained, "what make life
worth living",
then they cannot be the "intrinsic" properties described by some philosophe=
rs.


4. If you make yourself really small, you can externalize virtually everyth=
ing
Friday, 16 November, at 3 p.m.
EHESS, salle 524, 54 boulevard Raspail, 75006 Paris
Abstract:
  Many habits of thought encourage or seduce us into subtracting more
and more from
the Self, or Subject, until it threatens to become a singularity, a
dimensionless
point packed with paradoxical powers. When we learn to enlarge our
concept of the
Self, and distribute its responsibilities in space and time, these paradoxe=
s
evaporate. A particularly clear case of this is found in the
interpretation of the
experiments by Benjamin Libet, which have wrongly been interpreted to show =
that
"your brain decides what to do about half a second before you do."

--
Francois Recanati


New address/nouvelle adresse:


Institut Jean-Nicod (CNRS/EHESS)
1bis, avenue de Lowendal
75007 Paris, France

Telephone: [33] (0)1 53 59 32 82
fax: [33] (0)1 53 59 32 99
email: recanati@ehess.fr
http://www.institutnicod.org

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